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Abstract 
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate 
psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed 
accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological 
explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research we argue that 
there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social 
motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of 
prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favour of 
our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden’s fellow-feeling account (due 
originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that the social motivation hypothesis not only stands 
as a proximate account in its own right; it also provides a plausible scaffold for other more 
sophisticated motivations (e.g. fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible 
implications the social motivation hypothesis has on existing modeling practice. 
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It is widely accepted that a distinctive aspect of human sociality is the pervasive engagement 
in “prosocial behavior”, which can be roughly characterized here as an individual’s choice to 
forgo her immediate material interests in order to benefit other(s) or a group to which she 
belongs. Many behavioral economic models hypothesize some proximate motivations in 
addition to purely material self-interest in order to explain such prosocial behavior. However, 
the proposed psychological mechanisms are often rather casually proposed to accommodate 
behavioral data in stock experimental games, and are often poorly informed by psychological 
research. Moreover, contrary to the stated ambitions, this strategy so far remains 
unsuccessful in delivering a unified picture of what motivates prosocial behavior (Clavien and 
Klein 2010).  
 
This paper was triggered by the following observation: perhaps there are too many models 
and not enough attention to the empirical work in various areas of psychology. It seems as 
though we should try to get the psychological (proximate) mechanisms right before 
modelling a particular motivation as an augment of an individual utility function, or 
presuming that such modelling strategy is indeed the best way to proceed. We support this 
move while acknowledging that like any empirical hypothesis, psychological ones are fallible 
and in principle open to revision. Still, we hope that this paper will not only provide the 
reader with a psychologically realistic and plausible proximate account of prosocial behavior, 
but also prompt some general methodological reflections on how psychological research 
bears on existing modelling practice.  
 
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we consider the two psychologically most informed 
economic modelling strategies for explaining prosociality, and argue that they are, at least as 
stands, unsatisfactory with respect to providing proximate accounts of prosocial behavior. In 
section 3, we consider Adam Smith’s fellow-feeling hypothesis revived by Robert Sugden 
(2002), as a more promising alternative for the motivations for norm following/team 
reasoning. In section 4, we present a different social motivation hypothesis as well as some 
convergent evidence for it and in section 5, we argue that social motivations might be 
understood as a scaffold for the more specific rewards involved in fellow-feelings and, 
analogously, as a general scaffolder for other candidate proximate accounts of prosocial 
behavior. Section 6 concludes with some methodological reflections.  
2. Economic models of prosocial behavior 
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Prosocial behavior, such as cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and public goods 
games (PG), fair offers in ultimatum bargaining games (UG), and trusting and sharing in 
trust games, is a fairly robust experimental phenomenon -- even in those experiments where 
one is careful to ensure that the subjects believe that interactions are anonymous and that 
there is no future interaction with other subjects (see e.g. Camerer 2003, ch. 2 for a review).  
 
We can identify at least four approaches within the rational choice tradition that purport to 
explain such experimental results as well as our prosocial behavior in analogous real life 
situations. The first two are (i) the rational cooperation in repeated games approach, 
according to which people mistakenly behave prosocially in one-shot games because humans 
have evolved in repeated interactions where cooperation is rational (e.g. Binmore 2006); and 
(ii) the social preference approach, which models people’s motivations as stable “social 
preferences” for equity, fairness, etc. that are defined in terms of the material payoffs of 
games (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Although popular among behavioral economists, there 
is convincing empirical evidence against these hypotheses (see e.g. Gächter and Thöni 2007 
for a review). Moreover, these accounts do not explicitly address motivations of prosocial 
behavior: the first (i) simply assumes such motivations to be explanatorily irrelevant; and the 
second (ii) crudely equates prosocial motivations with preferences for different distribution of 
players’ material payoffs in games. We therefore focus on the two other approaches in this 
paper: (1) social norms; and (2) team reasoning.   
 
Both (1) social norms and (2) team reasoning seem to hold the most promise for explaining a 
range of experimental results (see Tan and Zizzo (2008); Guala et al. (2013) for empirical 
evaluations). The approaches are also (though not always) accompanied by explicit 
discussions of what motivates norm adherence and team reasoning, respectively. However, 
after a discussion of each approach, we will briefly argue that these proximate accounts are 
ultimately unsatisfactory. 
 
2.1 Social norms approach 
 
The social norms approach has been gaining popularity due to the growing evidence that 
specific expectations (beliefs) as well as preferences influence prosocial behavior in economic 
games. Unlike the social preferences approach, which assumes some stable other-regarding 
preferences at work in all contexts, the social norm approach adopts the idea of conditional 
preference. One of the main proponents of the approach, Christina Bicchieri thus argues that 
the preference to follow a norm or behavioral rule is activated only if the individual believes 
(a) that enough others will follow the rule (“empirical expectation”) and (b) that enough 
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others will expect her to follow (“normative expectation”) (Bicchieri 2006). Due to this 
conditionalization of preferences as relative to certain expectations and perhaps also what 
norms are identified, the social norms have a positive explanation for why we should expect 
(some) prosocial behavior to occur in some contexts (e.g. ultimatum games with humans) and 
not in others (e.g. ultimatum games with computers) (see Bicchieri 2006, p. 125, also pp. 168-
170). Once these epistemic conditions of norm identification are met, Bicchieri’s model 
predicts that players’ payoffs in a game are transformed. That is, players’ payoffs for different 
outcomes of the game are subjectively modified to take into account players’ taste for certain 
social norms (of fairness, cooperation, etc.). This changes the payoff structure of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and other economic games by, for example, rendering defection or 
“unfair” behaviour less attractive, which in turn makes their overall self-interest aligned with 
prosocial norms. Social norms “tug at our utility” of what is economically rational 
(Paternotte and Grose 2012). The approach thus models individual utilities such that they 
involve preferences for norm conformity. 
 
But what precisely motivates people to follow social norms, once the epistemic conditions of 
norm identification are met? Insofar as the social norm approach can go beyond just 
describing the behavior itself in terms of conditional preferences or stipulate that the mere 
identification of the norm itself automatically triggers norm following, the model owes us a 
proximate explanation for why agents are motivated to follow the norm and adhere to others’ 
expectations.2 In other words, the mere activation of a social norm (or an expectation that 
there is such a norm at work) is not sufficient since there must be something that explains 
why empirical and normative expectations matter to individuals. 
 
The same question is provoked by Herbert Gintis’s (2010) model of social norms, which, just 
like Bicchieri’s, presupposes that people have preferences to follow social norms.3 Gintis 
(2011) however stresses that certain moral values and character virtues lead individuals to 
voluntarily conform to norms. These values and virtues include promise-keeping, fairness, 
and honesty, and they manifest as behavioral regularities that facilitate cooperation and 
enhance social efficiency (Gintis 2011, 884). According to Gintis, individuals internalize these 
behavioral regularities through processes of socialization where the moral values and 
character are instilled by the interplay of affect and authority and induce us to comply and 
conform to the specified norms that promote prosocial behavior. This internalization means 
                                                 
2
 Although Bicchieri explicitly states (2006, p. 3) that her belief-desire model of choice is compatible with the 
possibility that our norm following behaviour occurs subconsciously without deliberate decision, she does 
not understand this folk psychological model as an “as if” model. 
3
 Gintis (2010) models social norms as a coordination device (the “choreographer”) that enables players to 
choose one from multiple Nash equilibria, using the concept of correlated equilibrium.  See for further 
comparisons of Biccheri’s and Gintis’s models. 
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agents behave prosocially even if there is no possibility of being penalized for selfish behavior 
and being rewarded for prosocial behavior. “Morality, in this way, is doing the right thing 
even if no one is looking” (Gintis 2010, 252).  
 
Now, Gintis admits that moral character and virtues do not always guarantee norm abidance 
as other conflicting interests are also present. Yet insofar as we act prosocially, Gintis 
believes that the central motivation for such behavior is normative or moral: doing the right 
thing in the situation. Still, it seems that Gintis might be too optimistic in thinking that 
moral and character virtues alone are responsible for inducing norm abidance. Recent 
empirical work in moral psychology shows that those moral principles and character, 
including virtues, that are used to justify actions, do not appear to have any ‘formative’ role 
in our decision-making (for a review, see Merritt et al. 2010). Some even suggest that moral 
reasoning is a result of confabulation (Wheatley & Haidt 2005; Schnall et al 2008). Either 
way, the role of moral traits and virtues as proximate explanations has not been confirmed to 
the extent assumed by Gintis.4 
 
Bicchieri (2006, 13-25) provides a more nuanced and extended proximate account. She 
suggests three types of motivations for norm adherence: (i) fear of resentment (and of more 
consequential punishment), (ii) desire to please others’ expectations and preferences, and (iii) 
belief that others’ normative expectation is legitimate. Bicchieri places most credence in (iii) 
and argues that acceptance of certain norms (e.g. cooperation in PG or fair offer in UG) as 
reasonable or legitimate, is the more important proximate explanation. In interactions with 
family and friends, a generic desire to meet others’ expectations will suffice, but in most other 
interactions with socially distant others she contends that generic desires (i) and (ii) have 
little motivating power, and so the beliefs about social norms being legitimate are required. 
 
It is undeniable that people are sometimes motivated to meet others’ expectations because 
they find those expectations reasonable or legitimate. But it seems norm conformity is not 
always associated with the perception of reasonableness. For example, Solomon Asch’s 
(1955) classic experiments show that an individual’s easy judgment about the length of a line 
was significantly influenced by the answer given by other members of a group when the 
answer was obviously wrong but unanimous. In such cases, conformity alone seems to 
motivate even if the expectations of others are unreasonable. Thus conformity seems to be 
de-coupled from the perceived reasonableness of the norms (see Lisciandra et al. 2013 for a 
similar conformity effect on normative judgements). In other words, people seem to behave 
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 In addition, Gintis does not specify the epistemic conditions under which once-internalised norms are 
triggered (see Paternotte and Grose 2012). 
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as if they just want to conform to the majority’s opinions and preferences, regardless of 
whether it is reasonable to do so or not. 
 
In fact, once we turn to Bicchieri’s own model, motivations of types (i) and (ii), seem required 
in order to derive (iii). In her account of conditional preferences, Bicchieri distinguishes two 
types of “normative expectation”, i.e. one’s belief that a sufficiently large subset of population 
expects one to conform to a behavioral regularity in a type of situations. The first type is an 
empirical expectation (i.e. belief that others think one will conform), and the second normative 
(i.e. belief that others think one ought to conform) (2006, 15).5 What motivates us to act 
according to such expectations? It seems that viewing such expectations as legitimate or 
reasonable is not going to do the work in either case: the expectation that others think one 
will conform does not in and of itself make the expectation legitimate: it is just a majority 
opinion about what will likely be the case. Similarly, a normative belief (that others think one 
ought to conform) will not be viewed as reasonable unless one thinks that the majority 
opinion itself is a source of legitimacy. In both cases, legitimacy or reasonableness in 
Bicchieri’s sense seems to be ultimately grounded in the majority opinion and the majority 
opinion alone can motivate only if one already has a conformist preference of types (i) and (ii). 
For this reason, her distinction between (i) and (ii) as a generic conformist desire and (iii) as 
reason, as well as her emphasis on the latter, does not hold.6 
 
In contrast to Gintis and Bicchieri, Robert Sugden (2000) models social norms explicitly 
based on the non-normative conformist desire. He introduces a resentment hypothesis, according 
to which we are motivated to meet the expectations of others because we are averse to their 
resentment -- a resentment that we expect will be provoked by frustrating their expectations. 
Sugden takes this to be an empirically confirmable fact about human psychology; that is, 
people resent someone who violates their well-established empirical expectations, and people 
are averse to face such resentment themselves. Supposing we do find others’ expectations 
“legitimate”, then this will be explained by wanting to please them because not doing so will 
provoke their resentment. So to use Bicchieri’s distinctions, the type (iii) motivation (to do 
something legitimate) is grounded in type (ii) motivation (to please others’ expectations), 
which in turn derives from more basic type (i) motivation (to avoid others’ resentment).  
 
                                                 
5
 So Bicchieri’s terminology is slightly unfortunate. When she calls two epistemic conditions “empirical” and 
“normative” expectations, she only means that the former is a belief about others’ behaviour, while the 
latter is a belief about others’ beliefs about one’s behavior. 
6
 In Bicchieri’s examples of social norm engineering, such as anti-littering and a campaign against college 
students’ binge drinking, people’s behavior changes, not by changing their belief that a certain behavior is 
legitimate or not, but by changing the perception of how widespread a certain behaviour is. Such an 
intervention also presupposes a sort of generic preference for conformity. 
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We agree that the aversion toward being a target of resentment might motivate the 
conditional preferences to meet others’ expectations in Bicchieri’s model.7 Still, it is 
questionable whether aversion of resentment is the type of psychological feature that can 
explain a wide range of prosocial behaviour, including cooperation in one-shot PG games 
where one has no reason to expect cooperation as a norm. Moreover it raises the question of 
why other resentment should matter to us anyway -- especially if they are strangers. All the 
same, we do not wish to argue against the resentment hypothesis at this stage. We believe 
that the resentment hypothesis has a legitimate place as a proximate account, but only once 
one finds an appropriate mechanism that explains why resentment should matter to us in the 
first place - a task we will turn to in the succeeding sections of this paper. In section 3 we will 
see how Sugden himself suggests what might possibly scaffold such resentment, but in 
section 4 and onward we will argue that the social motivation hypothesis can provide a 
superior and more basic account of the resentment hypothesis. 
2.2 Team Reasoning Approach 
 
A prominent contender of the social norm approach to explaining prosocial behavior is the 
team reasoning approach (Sugden 1993, 2000, Bacharach 2006, Coleman et al. 2008). Here 
the prosocial behavior is modelled by an individual identifying herself as a member of a team, and 
thus playing her part in order to achieve the group’s objective. If a player identifies herself as a 
member of a group consisting of all or most of the players, then it is rational action to 
cooperate or coordinate with others, since it will uniquely maximize the group’s collective 
payoff. The account then involves an agency transformation that is distinct from the payoff 
transformation of the social norm approach.8 
 
The team reasoning approach needs to specify the epistemic conditions for the presumed 
agency transformation -- or shift from I-mode to we-mode, to use Tuomela’s (2007) 
terminology. Bacharach (2006), who offers one of the most systematic presentations of the 
team reasoning approach to date, proposes the ‘interdependence hypothesis’ that roughly 
states that the agency transformation is triggered if the agents perceive common goals that 
can only be achieved together (for conditions for agency transformation see Bacharach, 2006, 
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 Sugden (2000) sketches his own model of social norms, but to our knowledge no one, including himself, 
has tested this model. 
8
 Often the team reasoning model is misunderstood as just another other-regarding preference model 
where “other” regards the group to which an individual belongs. An analysis of the Hi-Lo game shows this is 
not so. A Hi-Lo game is a two-person, two-by-two, normal form, symmetric pure coordination game in which 
one Nash equilibrium (Hi, Hi), say (2, 2) pareto-dominates the other (Lo, Lo), say (1, 1). The individuals’ 
payoff transformation that takes into account the group’s payoff changes the payoff of (Hi, Hi) as (4, 4), (Lo, 
Lo) as (2, 2), which leaves both as Nash equilibria. In contrast, the agency transformation makes (Hi, Hi) as a 
unique equilibrium of the game. 
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pp. 83-85; Smerilli 2012). The epistemic conditions of the interdependent hypothesis are thus 
provided by such features representing the uncertain prospect of mutual benefit. 
 
For Bacharach, the shift in framing occurs spontaneously and is not a matter of choice. 
Nevertheless, even supposing that conscious choice typically does not enter into the agency 
transformation, the account still seems to require some proximate account of the 
psychological features in the individual agent that are responsible for such a shift (Pacherie 
2011). For unlike a purely perspectival shift between alternative ways of looking at a gestalt 
figure, the framing effect relevant for agency transformation does seem to require some 
sustained proximate account with both cognitive and motivational elements. Consider for 
example the analogous reference-dependent framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1981), 
which is purportedly proximally explained by loss-aversion.  
 
While Bacharach (2006, ch 3) suggests that group selection can account for why propensities 
to team reason have arisen under conditions consistent with the interdependence hypothesis, 
he does not give any detail as to what psychological propensities account for the 
identification of such features. Indeed, it is not only team-reasoning accounts who are 
typically silent on what motivates the initial and continued attachment to the group. This 
problem is common with an influential philosophical theory of collective intentionality 
(Gilbert 2013), which presupposes a joint commitment of the members to their group’s goals, 
but does not give an account of proximate motivation for such commitment (Pacherie 2011). 
 
It is notable that the resentment hypothesis that was intended as a complement to the social 
norm approach and also played some role there is not applicable in the case of team 
reasoning. Since a key epistemic condition spelled out in the interdependent hypothesis is a 
perception of a mutually beneficial but uncertain outcome, this seems to block the possibility 
that it is the fear of resentment that motivates agent transformation (since why would such 
circumstances provoke resentment?). Moreover, presumably collective intentionality 
theorists would also hesitate to posit fear of resentment as a motivational basis of a joint 
commitment, since that would reduce the model of collective intentionality to one of 




In this section we have discussed the proximate hypotheses of the most psychologically 
informed economic approaches to prosocial behavior: the social norm and team reasoning 
approaches. Our first result is that Bicchieri’s model of social norms presupposes some 
motivational account, and that Sugden's resentment hypothesis is currently the best 
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candidate. However we also suggested that the hypothesis seems to call for an explanation of 
why the resentment of others should matter to us and noted that it is ill fit to deal with the 
team reasoning approach (which lacks any explicit proximate account of its own). We now 
move on to some general proximate accounts that are more promising, but will have reasons 
to return some of the hypotheses of this past section (like the resentment hypothesis) in 
section 5 to show how they can be scaffolded on more basic social motivations. 
 
3. The “fellow-feeling” hypothesis 
 
In his 2002 paper, Sugden admits that team reasoning lacks a motivational dimension just 
like other rational choice models. His remedy draws heavily on Adam Smith’s work Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1759) and suggests that Smith’s account of fellow-feeling “may be able to fill 
these gaps by explaining the affective qualities of team thinking.” (2002, p. 82) While Sugden 
clearly takes the approach as a complement to the team reasoning account, rather than the 
social norm account, we will consider the fellow-feeling hypothesis as a potential 
psychological account of prosocial motivation in general, i.e. for both norm following and 
team reasoning.  
 
According to Sugden, Adam Smith suggests that simply doing things together with others 
rather than alone creates added value to activities by giving a certain satisfaction or reward. 
This reward is due to participants’ positive affective awareness of their corresponding 
sentiments. This is also the definition of fellow-feeling: the pleasant awareness of corresponding 
sentiments or emotions. Smith claims that this fellow-feeling is rewarding irrespective of the 
valence of original sentiments. Thus, fellow-feeling cannot be reduced to mere reflected 
emotions: “this correspondence of sentiments of others with our own appears to be a cause of 
pleasure, and want of it a cause of pain, which cannot be accounted for ‘by a theory of 
reflected feelings’” (Sugden 2002, p. 72). The agreement of feelings be they joy or grief, is thus 
a source of reward or pleasure in its own right such that fellow-feeling “enlivens joy and 
alleviates grief.” (Smith, 2002, 18).  
 
According to Smith, our desire to experience fellow-feelings motivates us to align our actions 
and emotions with those of others. Moreover, those that have a history of repeated 
interactions will be more likely to experience such fellow-feelings:   
 
On Smith's account, it is a fact of human psychology that people who repeatedly interact with 
one another tend to develop and express common sentiments. Such common sentiments tend to 
eventually become the objects of common approval within the group of interacting people. 
Thus, the observed failure of any one member of a social group to uphold the attitudes of that 
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group will cause pain or unease to other members (this is just the negative equivalent of the 
pleasure of mutual sympathy); and it will be disapproved of. (Sugden 2002, 82-83) 
 
The account can thus be seen as a proximate complement to the existing prosocial models 
since people become motivated to adjust their emotions and behaviour to fit with the 
communal “norms of propriety” or else they will forgo opportunities for fellow-feelings. That 
is, the pleasure derived from fellow-feelings motivates individuals to uphold certain shared 
emotions and behavioral regularities that are associated with them. The pleasure associated 
with fellow-feelings also motivates individuals to identify with groups that they have 
interacted with in the past and to uphold the communal norms of these groups. Alternatively, 
as Bicchieri would put it, fellow -feelings give individuals a reason to comply with empirical 
and normative expectations. While a generic desire to meet other people’s expectations 
cannot explain our context- and group-specific prosocial behavior (Bicchieri 2006, 25), the 
fellow-feeling hypothesis implies that we are only motivated by those expectations that have 
arisen during those previous social interactions that included shared sentiments. True 
fellow-feeling is a generic affect for both Sugden and Smith, but repeated interactions with 
fellow-feelings are needed for the generic emotion to reliably motivate people to follow 
context- and group-specific social norms.   
 
The affective rewards that the individuals derive from the interaction and the motivations 
that precede them, are thus valuable in their own right. In Sugden’s own words, “we directly 
desire to participate in society, and not merely the ends that it produces” (2002, 85). 
Nevertheless the motivational power of fellow-feeling proposal relies on rewards that are 
only attainable from shared emotions in social interaction and dependent on awareness of 
other participants’ corresponding emotions. In the next section we will argue that because of 
this the fellow-feeling approach is still too restrictive and that correspondence or mutuality 
of sentiment might not be a prerequisite for all experiences of intrinsic social rewards. The 
model we present will thus be a weaker and also a more basic model of social motivation. The 
social motivation here derives from social affiliative stimuli that neither demand aligned 
emotions. 
 
4. The social motivation hypothesis 
 
The pleasurable reward in the fellow-feeling account was connected to a distinctive type of 
social encounter. In such encounters, emotions of the participants are aligned such that all 
may reap enjoyment from it; but why suppose that it is only on these occasions that sociality 
is rewarding? There seems to be a broader array of affiliative stimuli, i.e., interactions with, 
or observations of, other humans, which have the potential to generate intrinsically 
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rewarding experiences. These occasions are often consciously, recorded as warmth, affection, 
and other positive affect connected to affiliation.9 Neuroscience also suggests that the set of 
basic biological and psychological mechanisms that generate these rewards are elicited by the 
same modalities of sensory affiliative stimuli (i.e. touch), even if the social activities that 
generate the sensory stimulation are different (Crews 1998; Mason & Mendoza 1998; Depue 
& Morrone-Strupinsky 2005). Although activities involving shared emotional experiences 
certainly induce these rewards, several other activities are also capable of this effect, e.g. 
those that are more purely coordinative, explorative, and even more competitive in character 
(think of how academics enjoy a verbal sparr even if this activity often involves antagonistic 
emotions between the disputants).10 Sometimes the reward may even be elicited by 
something as fleeting as someone smiling at you.  
 
It is commonly thought that the role of the neurobiological substrates underlying the 
affective rewards of affiliative stimuli (oxytocin, vasopressin, endogenous opioids) is to orient 
and bias attention to very basic forms of mammalian affiliation (parent and child) as well as 
forming social relationships more generally (Nelson and Panksepp 1998; Depue and 
Morrone-Strupinsky 2005). The experience of rewards attached to social interaction and 
affiliation generates social motivation circuitry that not only motivates us to seek the 
pleasure in social interactions (affective reward); it also to work to establish and facilitate 
social bonds (Godman 2013). Many social bonds in other primates are also thought to be 
mediated or enhanced by rewards elicited during activities such as play and grooming (Silk 
et al. 2009). The social rewards elicited by affiliative stimuli thus provide a foundation for the 
capacity for forming social bonds crucial to human development and flourishing (see e.g 
Baumeister 1995).  
 
So how precisely does the experience of a reward attached to social affiliative stimuli lead to a 
social motivation? The thriving general field of motivation research backs up the Humean 
assumption about how motivations typically grow out from an anticipation of a reward 
(Berridge 2003; Wise 2004). In the case of social affect, the idea would be that affiliative 
stimuli initially becomes “incentively salienced” due to the biased capacity for experiencing 
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 In the theory of interpersonal behaviour, affiliation is one of the two major independent traits, 
characterized by warmth, positive emotions, and agreeableness (the other is agency characterized by 
assertiveness and activity). To represent social stimuli that are affiliative, experiments typically use pictures 
of smiling babies and families. (See Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005, 315). 
10
 The academics enjoy the sparr and thus get reward from it but their enjoyment is not shared in a robust 
sense (see Salmela 2012). Their emotion is shared only in a weak sense of being the same type (enjoyment) 
and having the same intentional object (the sparr). Even if the participants enjoy the sparr, their concerns 
are directly opposite within this activity: both strive to win, but since sparr is a zero-sum game where one 
agent’s win is another’s loss, their emotions do not correspond within the activity. Accordingly, no fellow-
feelings emerge. 
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such rewards. The initial link between affiliative stimuli and social reward is then 
strengthened in terms of basic associative learning. That is, because rewards are typically 
attached to certain affiliative stimuli, they become increasingly associated in such a way that 
they yield (social) motivations in expectation of distinctively social rewards. Thus, due to the 
intrinsic rewards afforded by affiliation and sociality, we become ever more oriented toward 
the social world. But, just like in the case of other rewards, sometimes, wanting eventually 
occurs without the accompanying conscious, or unconscious, experience of “liking”, thereby 
indicating how motivations can be de-coupled from the associated reward (Berridge and 
Robinson 2003). (This may indeed be the case in many economic games where subjects are 
naturally conditioned to a particular social reward that is not in fact elicited). 
The social motivation hypothesis then contends that there is a particular psychological 
disposition whose role is to orient us toward affiliative stimuli, which yields social reward 
(affect) and enables the formation of social bonds. In fact, the hypothesis is nicely captured by 
Coralie Chevallier and colleagues who defend a social motivation hypothesis in a rather 
different context: namely in the case of autism (more on this in a moment) :  
 
“Social motivation can be described as a set of psychological dispositions and 
biological mechanisms biasing the individual to preferentially orient to the social 
world (social orienting), to seek and take pleasure in social interactions (social 
reward), and to work to foster and maintain social bonds (social maintaining).” (2012, 
p.231) 
 
It is important to emphasise that the kind of affiliative stimuli that people seek and find 
rewarding depends crucially on their past experiences and learned associations. Some 
individuals may actually become motivated to seek antagonistic social encounters (e.g. 
winning academic debates or fighting with partners); perhaps because they have found other 
rewards in such activities or even because antagonism is actually a condition of affiliating 
with others. On the other hand if one constantly meets rejection and ostracism in trying to 
affiliate with particular others, typically one will feel bad and eventually gives up, or try to 
find social rewards elsewhere. In short, social motivations are contingent upon their history 
of particular learned associations and although at a baseline we take some initial affiliative 
stimuli to be rewarding in their own right, we are not committed to claiming that all social 
stimuli must remain rewarding and sought for. 
 
In recent years there has been several studies in different domains of developmental 
psychology and psychiatry that have suggested that social motivation arises early in 
development and is a crucial feature of human psychology. Social motivations have been 
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suggested to not only mediate and facilitate bonding but also to explain autism and the 
pervasive tendency for social learning (i.e. learning by copying others, rather than trial-and-
error learning). Here we will only mention a couple of examples of such convergent evidence.   
 
First, it is well-established that infants are born with a preferential ability to track and fixate 
stimuli that appear human-like and evidence indicates that this is mediated by the 
neurological centre for affective processing - the amygdala (Pierce et al 2001; Young et al 
2005). In addition, recent research shows how the amygdala is involved in quickly detecting 
salient and diagnostically relevant facial features by enabling attentional orienting toward 
the visual periphery (Gamer et al 2013). These results suggest that we are preferentially 
oriented toward one of the most basic form of social affiliative stimuli -- the facial expressions 
of others -- due to the associated affective reward. 
 
Recently social motivation has also become an important rival hypothesis to the standard 
‘theory of mind deficit’ approach to explaining autism (Chevallier et al 2012). The model 
suggests that autistic subjects’ difficulties with social life are better accounted for by 
diminished social motivation rather than a failure of ‘theory of mind’, precisely because the 
perception of social affiliative stimuli, like facial expressions, gestures and vocalizations are 
not accompanied by any distinctive type of reward. The lack of social motivation thus 
impedes social development and can account for many of the interpersonal deficits associated 
with the autistic spectrum disorder (Maestro et al 2002; Chevallier et al 2012). 
  
Finally, social motivations have been suggested to play a prominent role in human ontogeny 
in biasing social learning over individual learning. Cecilia Heyes has for example suggested 
that what explains abundant human social learning strategy is social motivations and other 
perceptual biases which privilege information received via social channels over any individual 
learning channels (2012, p. 7). Some evidence for this comes from work on imitation where 
social motivations are a strong contender for explaining the pancultural human propensity 
for so-called overimitation, i.e. the tendency to reproduce a high fidelity match of the model's 
behavior to the extent that the efficiency of the task is reduced (Nielsen & Tomaselli 2009). 
In cases of overimitation we do not reach the goal in the most effective way possible, but try 
to do it in precisely the way it has been modeled to us. For example, children begin to 
overimitate at the age of two but by no means cease to do so when they become adults 
(McGuigan et al 2012). Social motivations provide a compelling explanation for why this is 
so. That is, reproducing the modeled actions appears to be more important than merely 
producing the outcomes more efficiently, precisely because we are socially motivated to 
engage in the activity. (Over)imitation is not merely a means of learning skills or acquiring 
information about the world; it is also a means of engaging with others and attaining social 
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rewards (Uzgiris 1981; Nielsen & Blank 2011). The social motivation thesis thus predicts 
that whenever the opportunity for social rewards are particularly salient part of the target 
for learning, how the effect is produced will matter more than that it is produced in the most 
effective way possible. 
 
Taken together this evidence from different strands of psychology also suggests an 
evolutionary argument for the emergence of social motivations. Most likely they originated 
in their role of facilitating and maintaining social bonds -- a role which renders them not 
exclusively human, but among humans it is likely that they are a particularly strong 
motivator (e.g. non-human animals do not tend to over-imitate). Indeed it may be part of the 
explanation for why humans are regarded as the “hyper-social species”. Of course many tie 
the trait of hyper-sociality to the emergence of culture, social norms, and large-scale 
cooperation (Boyd & Richerson, 2009) and at the very least once culture enters into the 
picture, it is highly likely that culture will co-opt some of the psychological bias for social 
reward into new roles. One is their role in facilitating social learning and the fidelity of social 
transmission; another is further biasing individuals to prosocial behavior. Indeed it is natural 
to suppose that social motivations are precisely the sort of psychological capacity that can be 
harnessed to achieve common, indeed genuinely altruistic ends that involve overall material 
sacrifice for the individual, such as when social motivations help to facilitate cooperation and 
cohesion amongst groups.11 
 
5. Social motivations as scaffolders 
 
The social motivation hypothesis is more general than the fellow-feeling approach in terms 
of what type of stimuli yield an affective social reward. For affiliative stimuli to be rewarding, 
there is no requirement of fellow-feeling, or for that matter shared emotions in social 
activities. In this section we will consider the relationship between the two accounts more 
closely and review some evidence from synchrony studies that offers support to our more 
general social motivation hypothesis over the fellow-feeling account. However our more 
important aim is to argue that social motivations should be thought of as a scaffold for the 
emergence of fellow-feelings and, analogously, for other proximal explanations of prosocial 
behavior.12  
 
                                                 
11
 While some cooperative endeavours might only be done by groups, or are more efficiently performed by 
groups, and so are not genuinely altruistic as they are aligned with self-interest; others might demand 
foregoing material self-interests. Researchers disagree on which mechanism (self-sacrificing or self-
interested prosociality) has more explanatory relevance (see Guala 2012). 
12
 We are very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that the concept of scaffolding might be 
employed to explain their relation. 
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First to the evidence from synchrony studies. The association between synchronised behavior, 
on the one hand, and affective reward, on the other, has been established in several different 
studies (e.g. Kirschner & Tomasello, 2010, Reddish et al., 2013;  for a review, see Knoblich et 
al., 2011). These affective rewards are associated with different types of synchrony, such as 
synchronized motor representations (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), body postures and gaze 
patterns (Shockley et al., 2009), speech patterns (Fowler et al., 2008), facial expressions 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), or heart rate (Vikhoff et al., 2013) of the interactors. A prominent 
sociological tradition argues that synchronous activities that are ritualistic interactions such 
as plays, games, dancing, singing, worship and ceremonies, lack any ulterior purpose or goal 
and instead have the function of producing affective rewards for the participants (e.g. 
Summers-Effler, 2007; Collins, 2004, Durkheim, 1912). The Smith-Sugden hypothesis posits 
that such rewards are produced via shared emotions and the concomitant fellow-feelings, i.e., 
pleasant awareness of shared emotions. This indeed seems to be the case in rituals, which 
provide an ample basis for shared emotions that can be experienced at different stages of the 
ritual: excitement during its performance; joy when it succeeds; fear when its success is 
threatened; disappointment at failure; anger at those disturbing the ritual or violating its 
rules, and so on (Parkinson et al, 2005; Helm, 2010, Salmela, 2012).  
 
However, there are many other synchronous behaviors, which are not institutionalised as 
rituals but nevertheless constitute basic building blocks for our daily interactions with others. 
These tend to be reflected in experiments where the resulting synchrony is accidental rather 
than purposefully achieved by the participants: individuals walk, tap fingers, rock chairs, and 
so on, either in or out of synchrony, or they rate interpersonal rapport between figures or 
sounds that are presented as in or out of synchrony (e.g. Hove & Risen, 2009; Miles et al., 
2009; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). In these cases, there is little opportunity for feedback and 
little history of interaction or reason to suppose the presence of shared intentionality. 
Nevertheless, in the studies cited above individuals who engaged in synchronous behavior 
reported greater feelings of interpersonal connectedness, rapport, and affiliation, and they 
sometimes cooperated more in a social dilemma than people in asynchronous conditions. 
Because participants also did not report any shared emotions, it is difficult to make sense of 
such findings on the fellow-feeling accounts (or rather, the fellow-feeling approach is at best 
silent about the positive effects of such activities). Instead the social motivation hypothesis 
seems better equipped in accounting for the pleasure and reward elicited in more basic 
synchronous activities. 
 
Based on this evidence from different synchrony studies, one might conclude that the fellow-
feeling hypothesis and social motivation hypothesis are not in competition but rather explain 
different kinds of synchrony. However, our proposal is that social motivations have a more 
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important role than simply being one alternative explanation. Instead, we contend that they 
can themselves explain the emergence of fellow-feelings. They do this by providing a basic 
platform for how we come to anticipate rewards of social interactions, which in turn informs 
the design and outcome of future interactions. For example, if individuals experience more 
basic and contingent behavioral synchrony as socially rewarding in its own right, we should 
also expect them to establish forms of social interaction in which synchrony and rewards are 
produced intentionally. This seems to be precisely what happens in rituals. Although it is very 
likely that rituals have the capacity to elicit fellow-feelings through the participants’ shared 
emotions at different stages of the ritual, such rewards are nevertheless initially enabled at 
least in part by social motivations and the anticipation of social rewards.  
 
We thus predict that the opportunity for fellow-feelings, not just in synchronous activities 
but more generally, is scaffolded by the basic types of social affiliative rewards described by 
the social motivation hypothesis. One way of understanding social motivations as a scaffold is 
in terms of social motivations becoming a condition for more sophisticated interactions like 
rituals. However, the key point here is that in doing so the social motivations also allow for 
the emergence of more complex reward structures such as the rewards of experiencing 
shared emotions. In fact, this also seems to be true of the resentment hypothesis, i.e. the 
desire to meet, and the aversion to frustrate, others’ expectations (Sugden). To the extent 
that these motivations account for prosocial behavior, it is because they are enabled by and 
elaborated on the more rudimental social motivations.  In fact, we might even have a reason 
to reconsider moral virtues (Gintis) and the perceived reasonableness of others’ expectations 
(Bicchieri), as legitimate proximate accounts for (some) prosocial behavior if they 
analogously seem to depend on the experience and anticipation of social rewards. In short if 
our affiliations with other individuals matter, so will their expectations, interests and moral 
claims on us. Hence, social motivations explain why moral virtues and others’ expectations 
matter to us or why they, as philosophers like to put it, acquire “motivational force”. In fact it 
is the strength of the social motivation hypothesis that it can function as a plausible scaffold 
for a range of different more sophisticated proximate accounts -- without any of them 
necessarily being reduced to the anticipation of an affective reward. 
 
Indeed, given that it is supposed that many social situations in contemporary societies 
already are governed by some identifiable moral, social and prudential norms governing 
behavior (or at least identifiable behavioural interactive patterns), it would be surprising if 
social motivations were not involved in scaffolding the development of more sophisticated 
preferences such as those described by the existing approaches. In this sense social 
motivations are always there, so to speak. Often by making a prosocial outcome of social 
interaction -- be it actual, anticipated, remembered, virtual-- at least, prima facie inherently 
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rewarding for us. That is not to say that social motivation could not explain prosocial 
behavior on its own without some auxiliary motivational account. On the contrary, we have 
argued with empirical evidence that in many cases the motivation to seek social-affiliative 
rewards is capable of motivating prosocial behavior, e.g. in situations where the conditions of 
other theories of proximate motivation are not met. Thus, the social motivation account 
stands on its own in addition to providing a scaffold for other proximate explanations of 
prosocial behavior.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We began by noting that many existing economic models of prosocial behavior have been 
rather silent on the proximate psychological mechanisms responsible for the target behavior. 
We identified the most psychologically plausible accounts and then based on this discussion 
and convergent recent evidence from several strands of psychological and biological research, 
we argued for an alternative social motivation hypothesis. Finally, we suggested that the 
social motivation account provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated 
proximate motivations that purport to explain prosocial behavior in more complex social 
interactions. 
Let us conclude by briefly addressing some possible implications for economic modelling of 
prosocial behavior. As we stated at the outset, the empirical and theoretical input from 
different fields in psychology does not unequivocally adjudicate between competing economic 
models of prosocial behavior. Nor have we proposed yet another utility function based on the 
social motivation hypothesis. Instead, we provided a basic and general proximate account; 
namely, social motivations that anticipate rewards attached to affiliation and which can 
scaffold a host of distinct prosocial motivations, such as moral virtues, aversion to 
resentment, pleasure of mutual emotions, and so on.  
Although we do not deny that it is possible to compare different models with different 
motivations in clear-cut experiments (this is one of the points of behavioral experiments, 
after all), an upshot of our argument is that there probably will not be a general, single utility 
function that encompasses all prosocial behavior. Instead, our account suggests a form of 
pluralism that requires different prosocial preferences to be elicited by contextual features 
such as the nature of the game or interaction, the past history of interaction, the strength of 
affiliation, and the existing norms or identified teams in a community.  
Still, the social motivation hypothesis also suggests some ways to organize this pluralism 
about preferences. First, given the importance of individual learning history and 
environment more generally for the precise development of social motivations (as described 
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in both section 4 & 5), we should expect some considerable heterogeneity amongst people in 
terms of their expectations and preferences in experimental and naturally occurring games. 
A satisfactory theory of prosocial behavior might try to first identify the different types of 
agents in their experiments, and then explain how these different types impact on the 
interaction, such as sustaining or declining levels of cooperation (cf. Gächter 2007). Second, 
given that social motivations can scaffold a range of distinct prosocial motivations, we should 
expect that each agent often has conflicting preferences that are elicited by variable salient 
contextual cues. Thus a general theory should ideally attempt to identify some general 
epistemic conditions for the elicitation of different preferences. For example Bicchieri’s 
conditions for payoff transformation and Bacharach’s conditions for agency transformation 
do not necessarily have to be seen as rival hypotheses, but instead they can both be part of a 
more general hypothesis which predicts that different conditions can elicit different 
preferences of the same individual. We hope that our proposal has provided some 
justification for these lines of enquiry. 
While what we have said so far is all broadly consistent with the rational choice tradition in 
psychology and economics (although perhaps suspending some of its ambitions of complete 
unification), the social motivation hypothesis might also provide a more basic challenge to 
the framework, which is the following: If affiliative rewards are truly rewards on par with the 
various material rewards, it may be unhelpful to define or operationalize rewards solely in 
terms of monetary payoffs in games, as for example social preference models do.  After all the 
research we have discussed suggests that the neurobiological basis for such rewards is both 
partly distinctive from other reward circuits, including material ones, and arises early in 
development and is retained throughout life. The hypothesis also makes good evolutionary 
sense given the importance of social bonding for not only wellbeing, but, indeed, survival. It 
is unclear if these ends can consistently be operationalized using monetary rewards. 
Thus, the social motivation hypothesis really has two primary implications for economic 
modelling of sociality roles. One is to posit social motivations as a scaffolder that generates 
motivations for norm-following and team reasoning, thus offering a candidate proximate or 
at least developmental explanation of prosocial behavior in the standard sense of 
representing a choice to forgo immediate material interests. The second and more 
provocative suggestion is that in many social contexts, including perhaps some experimental 
ones, the agent is also concerned with anticipated social-affiliative rewards quite 
independently of the material payoff distribution. In future modelling it might therefore be 
worthwhile to try to conceptualize and operationalize social rewards instead of just monetary 
rewards, for example by employing the kind of basic affiliative stimuli used in the 
psychological research we have drawn on.     
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